sslutil: store and use hostname and ui in socket instance

Currently, we pass a hostname and ui to sslutil.wrap_socket()
then create a separate sslutil.validator instance also from
a hostname and ui. There is a 1:1 mapping between a wrapped
socket and a validator instance. This commit lays the groundwork
for making the validation function generic by storing the
hostname and ui instance in the state dict attached to the
socket instance and then using these variables in the
validator function.

Since the arguments to sslutil.validator.__init__ are no longer
used, we make them optional and make __init__ a no-op.

mercurial/sslutil.py

@@ -1,365 +1,367 b''
 # sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial
 #
 # Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <[e-mail]>
 # Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <[e-mail]>
 # Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <[e-mail]>
 #
 # This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
 # GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
 
 from __future__ import absolute_import
 
 import os
 import ssl
 import sys
 
 from .i18n import _
 from . import (
     error,
     util,
 )
 
 # Python 2.7.9+ overhauled the built-in SSL/TLS features of Python. It added
 # support for TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, SNI, system CA stores, etc. These features are
 # all exposed via the "ssl" module.
 #
 # Depending on the version of Python being used, SSL/TLS support is either
 # modern/secure or legacy/insecure. Many operations in this module have
 # separate code paths depending on support in Python.
 
 hassni = getattr(ssl, 'HAS_SNI', False)
 
 try:
     OP_NO_SSLv2 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2
     OP_NO_SSLv3 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3
 except AttributeError:
     OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000
     OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000
 
 try:
     # ssl.SSLContext was added in 2.7.9 and presence indicates modern
     # SSL/TLS features are available.
     SSLContext = ssl.SSLContext
     modernssl = True
     _canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(SSLContext, 'load_default_certs')
 except AttributeError:
     modernssl = False
     _canloaddefaultcerts = False
 
     # We implement SSLContext using the interface from the standard library.
     class SSLContext(object):
         # ssl.wrap_socket gained the "ciphers" named argument in 2.7.
         _supportsciphers = sys.version_info >= (2, 7)
 
         def __init__(self, protocol):
             # From the public interface of SSLContext
             self.protocol = protocol
             self.check_hostname = False
             self.options = 0
             self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
 
             # Used by our implementation.
             self._certfile = None
             self._keyfile = None
             self._certpassword = None
             self._cacerts = None
             self._ciphers = None
 
         def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None):
             self._certfile = certfile
             self._keyfile = keyfile
             self._certpassword = password
 
         def load_default_certs(self, purpose=None):
             pass
 
         def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None):
             if capath:
                 raise error.Abort('capath not supported')
             if cadata:
                 raise error.Abort('cadata not supported')
 
             self._cacerts = cafile
 
         def set_ciphers(self, ciphers):
             if not self._supportsciphers:
                 raise error.Abort('setting ciphers not supported')
 
             self._ciphers = ciphers
 
         def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
             # server_hostname is unique to SSLContext.wrap_socket and is used
             # for SNI in that context. So there's nothing for us to do with it
             # in this legacy code since we don't support SNI.
 
             args = {
                 'keyfile': self._keyfile,
                 'certfile': self._certfile,
                 'server_side': server_side,
                 'cert_reqs': self.verify_mode,
                 'ssl_version': self.protocol,
                 'ca_certs': self._cacerts,
             }
 
             if self._supportsciphers:
                 args['ciphers'] = self._ciphers
 
             return ssl.wrap_socket(socket, **args)
 
 def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE,
                ca_certs=None, serverhostname=None):
     """Add SSL/TLS to a socket.
 
     This is a glorified wrapper for ``ssl.wrap_socket()``. It makes sane
     choices based on what security options are available.
 
     In addition to the arguments supported by ``ssl.wrap_socket``, we allow
     the following additional arguments:
 
     * serverhostname - The expected hostname of the remote server. If the
       server (and client) support SNI, this tells the server which certificate
       to use.
     """
     if not serverhostname:
         raise error.Abort('serverhostname argument is required')
 
     # Despite its name, PROTOCOL_SSLv23 selects the highest protocol
     # that both ends support, including TLS protocols. On legacy stacks,
     # the highest it likely goes in TLS 1.0. On modern stacks, it can
     # support TLS 1.2.
     #
     # The PROTOCOL_TLSv* constants select a specific TLS version
     # only (as opposed to multiple versions). So the method for
     # supporting multiple TLS versions is to use PROTOCOL_SSLv23 and
     # disable protocols via SSLContext.options and OP_NO_* constants.
     # However, SSLContext.options doesn't work unless we have the
     # full/real SSLContext available to us.
     #
     # SSLv2 and SSLv3 are broken. We ban them outright.
     if modernssl:
         protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23
     else:
         protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1
 
     # TODO use ssl.create_default_context() on modernssl.
     sslcontext = SSLContext(protocol)
 
     # This is a no-op on old Python.
     sslcontext.options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 | OP_NO_SSLv3
 
     # This still works on our fake SSLContext.
     sslcontext.verify_mode = cert_reqs
 
     if certfile is not None:
         def password():
             f = keyfile or certfile
             return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '')
         sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password)
 
     if ca_certs is not None:
         sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=ca_certs)
         caloaded = True
     else:
         # This is a no-op on old Python.
         sslcontext.load_default_certs()
         caloaded = _canloaddefaultcerts
 
     sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname)
     # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
     # closed
     # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
     if not sslsocket.cipher():
         raise error.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
 
     sslsocket._hgstate = {
         'caloaded': caloaded,
+        'hostname': serverhostname,
+        'ui': ui,
     }
 
     return sslsocket
 
 def _verifycert(cert, hostname):
     '''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname.
     CRLs is not handled.
 
     Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success.
     '''
     if not cert:
         return _('no certificate received')
     dnsname = hostname.lower()
     def matchdnsname(certname):
         return (certname == dnsname or
                 '.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1])
 
     san = cert.get('subjectAltName', [])
     if san:
         certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS']
         for name in certnames:
             if matchdnsname(name):
                 return None
         if certnames:
             return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames)
 
     # subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty
     for s in cert.get('subject', []):
         key, value = s[0]
         if key == 'commonName':
             try:
                 # 'subject' entries are unicode
                 certname = value.lower().encode('ascii')
             except UnicodeEncodeError:
                 return _('IDN in certificate not supported')
             if matchdnsname(certname):
                 return None
             return _('certificate is for %s') % certname
     return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate')
 
 
 # CERT_REQUIRED means fetch the cert from the server all the time AND
 # validate it against the CA store provided in web.cacerts.
 
 def _plainapplepython():
     """return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that
     * is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file
       system
     * presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches
       for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided
       cacerts file
     """
     if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable:
         return False
     exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower()
     return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or
             exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/'))
 
 def _defaultcacerts():
     """return path to default CA certificates or None."""
     if _plainapplepython():
         dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem')
         if os.path.exists(dummycert):
             return dummycert
 
     return None
 
 def sslkwargs(ui, host):
     """Determine arguments to pass to wrapsocket().
 
     ``host`` is the hostname being connected to.
     """
     kws = {'ui': ui}
 
     # If a host key fingerprint is on file, it is the only thing that matters
     # and CA certs don't come into play.
     hostfingerprint = ui.config('hostfingerprints', host)
     if hostfingerprint:
         return kws
 
     # The code below sets up CA verification arguments. If --insecure is
     # used, we don't take CAs into consideration, so return early.
     if ui.insecureconnections:
         return kws
 
     cacerts = ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
 
     # If a value is set in the config, validate against a path and load
     # and require those certs.
     if cacerts:
         cacerts = util.expandpath(cacerts)
         if not os.path.exists(cacerts):
             raise error.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cacerts)
 
         kws.update({'ca_certs': cacerts,
                     'cert_reqs': ssl.CERT_REQUIRED})
         return kws
 
     # No CAs in config. See if we can load defaults.
     cacerts = _defaultcacerts()
 
     # We found an alternate CA bundle to use. Load it.
     if cacerts:
         ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cacerts)
         ui.setconfig('web', 'cacerts', cacerts, 'defaultcacerts')
         kws.update({'ca_certs': cacerts,
                     'cert_reqs': ssl.CERT_REQUIRED})
         return kws
 
     # FUTURE this can disappear once wrapsocket() is secure by default.
     if _canloaddefaultcerts:
         kws['cert_reqs'] = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
         return kws
 
     return kws
 
 class validator(object):
-    def __init__(self, ui, host):
-        self.ui = ui
-        self.host = host
+    def __init__(self, ui=None, host=None):
+        pass
 
     def __call__(self, sock, strict=False):
-        host = self.host
+        host = sock._hgstate['hostname']
+        ui = sock._hgstate['ui']
 
         if not sock.cipher(): # work around http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
             raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
         try:
             peercert = sock.getpeercert(True)
             peercert2 = sock.getpeercert()
         except AttributeError:
             raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
 
         if not peercert:
             raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: '
                                'no certificate received') % host)
 
         # If a certificate fingerprint is pinned, use it and only it to
         # validate the remote cert.
-        hostfingerprints = self.ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', host)
+        hostfingerprints = ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', host)
         peerfingerprint = util.sha1(peercert).hexdigest()
         nicefingerprint = ":".join([peerfingerprint[x:x + 2]
             for x in xrange(0, len(peerfingerprint), 2)])
         if hostfingerprints:
             fingerprintmatch = False
             for hostfingerprint in hostfingerprints:
                 if peerfingerprint.lower() == \
                         hostfingerprint.replace(':', '').lower():
                     fingerprintmatch = True
                     break
             if not fingerprintmatch:
                 raise error.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected '
                                    'fingerprint %s') % (host, nicefingerprint),
                                  hint=_('check hostfingerprint configuration'))
-            self.ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s\n' %
-                          (host, nicefingerprint))
+            ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s\n' %
+                     (host, nicefingerprint))
             return
 
         # If insecure connections were explicitly requested via --insecure,
         # print a warning and do no verification.
         #
         # It may seem odd that this is checked *after* host fingerprint pinning.
         # This is for backwards compatibility (for now). The message is also
         # the same as below for BC.
-        if self.ui.insecureconnections:
-            self.ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
-                           'verified (check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
-                           'config setting)\n') %
-                         (host, nicefingerprint))
+        if ui.insecureconnections:
+            ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
+                      'verified (check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
+                      'config setting)\n') %
+                    (host, nicefingerprint))
             return
 
         if not sock._hgstate['caloaded']:
             if strict:
                 raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
                                     'verified') % (host, nicefingerprint),
                                   hint=_('check hostfingerprints or '
                                          'web.cacerts config setting'))
             else:
-                self.ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s '
-                               'not verified (check hostfingerprints or '
-                               'web.cacerts config setting)\n') %
-                             (host, nicefingerprint))
+                ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s '
+                          'not verified (check hostfingerprints or '
+                          'web.cacerts config setting)\n') %
+                        (host, nicefingerprint))
 
             return
 
         msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host)
         if msg:
             raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg),
                              hint=_('configure hostfingerprint %s or use '
                                     '--insecure to connect insecurely') %
                                   nicefingerprint)