sslutil: make cert fingerprints messages more actionable

The previous warning and abort messages were difficult to understand.
This patch makes them slightly better.

I think there is still room to tweak the messaging. And as we adopt
new security defaults, these messages will certainly change again.
But at least this takes us a step in the right direction.

References to "section" have been removed because if no fingerprint
is defined, "section" can never be "hostfingerprints." So just print
"hostsecurity" every time.

mercurial/sslutil.py

@@ -1,411 +1,411
 # sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial
 #
 # Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <[e-mail]>
 # Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <[e-mail]>
 # Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <[e-mail]>
 #
 # This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
 # GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
 
 from __future__ import absolute_import
 
 import os
 import ssl
 import sys
 
 from .i18n import _
 from . import (
     error,
     util,
 )
 
 # Python 2.7.9+ overhauled the built-in SSL/TLS features of Python. It added
 # support for TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, SNI, system CA stores, etc. These features are
 # all exposed via the "ssl" module.
 #
 # Depending on the version of Python being used, SSL/TLS support is either
 # modern/secure or legacy/insecure. Many operations in this module have
 # separate code paths depending on support in Python.
 
 hassni = getattr(ssl, 'HAS_SNI', False)
 
 try:
     OP_NO_SSLv2 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2
     OP_NO_SSLv3 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3
 except AttributeError:
     OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000
     OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000
 
 try:
     # ssl.SSLContext was added in 2.7.9 and presence indicates modern
     # SSL/TLS features are available.
     SSLContext = ssl.SSLContext
     modernssl = True
     _canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(SSLContext, 'load_default_certs')
 except AttributeError:
     modernssl = False
     _canloaddefaultcerts = False
 
     # We implement SSLContext using the interface from the standard library.
     class SSLContext(object):
         # ssl.wrap_socket gained the "ciphers" named argument in 2.7.
         _supportsciphers = sys.version_info >= (2, 7)
 
         def __init__(self, protocol):
             # From the public interface of SSLContext
             self.protocol = protocol
             self.check_hostname = False
             self.options = 0
             self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
 
             # Used by our implementation.
             self._certfile = None
             self._keyfile = None
             self._certpassword = None
             self._cacerts = None
             self._ciphers = None
 
         def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None):
             self._certfile = certfile
             self._keyfile = keyfile
             self._certpassword = password
 
         def load_default_certs(self, purpose=None):
             pass
 
         def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None):
             if capath:
                 raise error.Abort('capath not supported')
             if cadata:
                 raise error.Abort('cadata not supported')
 
             self._cacerts = cafile
 
         def set_ciphers(self, ciphers):
             if not self._supportsciphers:
                 raise error.Abort('setting ciphers not supported')
 
             self._ciphers = ciphers
 
         def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
             # server_hostname is unique to SSLContext.wrap_socket and is used
             # for SNI in that context. So there's nothing for us to do with it
             # in this legacy code since we don't support SNI.
 
             args = {
                 'keyfile': self._keyfile,
                 'certfile': self._certfile,
                 'server_side': server_side,
                 'cert_reqs': self.verify_mode,
                 'ssl_version': self.protocol,
                 'ca_certs': self._cacerts,
             }
 
             if self._supportsciphers:
                 args['ciphers'] = self._ciphers
 
             return ssl.wrap_socket(socket, **args)
 
 def _hostsettings(ui, hostname):
     """Obtain security settings for a hostname.
 
     Returns a dict of settings relevant to that hostname.
     """
     s = {
         # Whether we should attempt to load default/available CA certs
         # if an explicit ``cafile`` is not defined.
         'allowloaddefaultcerts': True,
         # List of 2-tuple of (hash algorithm, hash).
         'certfingerprints': [],
         # Path to file containing concatenated CA certs. Used by
         # SSLContext.load_verify_locations().
         'cafile': None,
         # Whether certificate verification should be disabled.
         'disablecertverification': False,
         # Whether the legacy [hostfingerprints] section has data for this host.
         'legacyfingerprint': False,
         # ssl.CERT_* constant used by SSLContext.verify_mode.
         'verifymode': None,
     }
 
     # Look for fingerprints in [hostsecurity] section. Value is a list
     # of <alg>:<fingerprint> strings.
     fingerprints = ui.configlist('hostsecurity', '%s:fingerprints' % hostname,
                                  [])
     for fingerprint in fingerprints:
         if not (fingerprint.startswith(('sha1:', 'sha256:', 'sha512:'))):
             raise error.Abort(_('invalid fingerprint for %s: %s') % (
                                 hostname, fingerprint),
                               hint=_('must begin with "sha1:", "sha256:", '
                                      'or "sha512:"'))
 
         alg, fingerprint = fingerprint.split(':', 1)
         fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower()
         s['certfingerprints'].append((alg, fingerprint))
 
     # Fingerprints from [hostfingerprints] are always SHA-1.
     for fingerprint in ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', hostname, []):
         fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower()
         s['certfingerprints'].append(('sha1', fingerprint))
         s['legacyfingerprint'] = True
 
     # If a host cert fingerprint is defined, it is the only thing that
     # matters. No need to validate CA certs.
     if s['certfingerprints']:
         s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
 
     # If --insecure is used, don't take CAs into consideration.
     elif ui.insecureconnections:
         s['disablecertverification'] = True
         s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
 
     if ui.configbool('devel', 'disableloaddefaultcerts'):
         s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False
 
     # Try to hook up CA certificate validation unless something above
     # makes it not necessary.
     if s['verifymode'] is None:
         # Find global certificates file in config.
         cafile = ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
 
         if cafile:
             cafile = util.expandpath(cafile)
             if not os.path.exists(cafile):
                 raise error.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cafile)
         else:
             # No global CA certs. See if we can load defaults.
             cafile = _defaultcacerts()
             if cafile:
                 ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cafile)
 
         s['cafile'] = cafile
 
         # Require certificate validation if CA certs are being loaded and
         # verification hasn't been disabled above.
         if cafile or (_canloaddefaultcerts and s['allowloaddefaultcerts']):
             s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
         else:
             # At this point we don't have a fingerprint, aren't being
             # explicitly insecure, and can't load CA certs. Connecting
             # at this point is insecure. But we do it for BC reasons.
             # TODO abort here to make secure by default.
             s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
 
     assert s['verifymode'] is not None
 
     return s
 
 def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, serverhostname=None):
     """Add SSL/TLS to a socket.
 
     This is a glorified wrapper for ``ssl.wrap_socket()``. It makes sane
     choices based on what security options are available.
 
     In addition to the arguments supported by ``ssl.wrap_socket``, we allow
     the following additional arguments:
 
     * serverhostname - The expected hostname of the remote server. If the
       server (and client) support SNI, this tells the server which certificate
       to use.
     """
     if not serverhostname:
         raise error.Abort('serverhostname argument is required')
 
     settings = _hostsettings(ui, serverhostname)
 
     # Despite its name, PROTOCOL_SSLv23 selects the highest protocol
     # that both ends support, including TLS protocols. On legacy stacks,
     # the highest it likely goes in TLS 1.0. On modern stacks, it can
     # support TLS 1.2.
     #
     # The PROTOCOL_TLSv* constants select a specific TLS version
     # only (as opposed to multiple versions). So the method for
     # supporting multiple TLS versions is to use PROTOCOL_SSLv23 and
     # disable protocols via SSLContext.options and OP_NO_* constants.
     # However, SSLContext.options doesn't work unless we have the
     # full/real SSLContext available to us.
     #
     # SSLv2 and SSLv3 are broken. We ban them outright.
     if modernssl:
         protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23
     else:
         protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1
 
     # TODO use ssl.create_default_context() on modernssl.
     sslcontext = SSLContext(protocol)
 
     # This is a no-op on old Python.
     sslcontext.options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 | OP_NO_SSLv3
 
     # This still works on our fake SSLContext.
     sslcontext.verify_mode = settings['verifymode']
 
     if certfile is not None:
         def password():
             f = keyfile or certfile
             return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '')
         sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password)
 
     if settings['cafile'] is not None:
         sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=settings['cafile'])
         caloaded = True
     elif settings['allowloaddefaultcerts']:
         # This is a no-op on old Python.
         sslcontext.load_default_certs()
         caloaded = True
     else:
         caloaded = False
 
     sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname)
     # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
     # closed
     # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
     if not sslsocket.cipher():
         raise error.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
 
     sslsocket._hgstate = {
         'caloaded': caloaded,
         'hostname': serverhostname,
         'settings': settings,
         'ui': ui,
     }
 
     return sslsocket
 
 def _verifycert(cert, hostname):
     '''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname.
     CRLs is not handled.
 
     Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success.
     '''
     if not cert:
         return _('no certificate received')
     dnsname = hostname.lower()
     def matchdnsname(certname):
         return (certname == dnsname or
                 '.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1])
 
     san = cert.get('subjectAltName', [])
     if san:
         certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS']
         for name in certnames:
             if matchdnsname(name):
                 return None
         if certnames:
             return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames)
 
     # subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty
     for s in cert.get('subject', []):
         key, value = s[0]
         if key == 'commonName':
             try:
                 # 'subject' entries are unicode
                 certname = value.lower().encode('ascii')
             except UnicodeEncodeError:
                 return _('IDN in certificate not supported')
             if matchdnsname(certname):
                 return None
             return _('certificate is for %s') % certname
     return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate')
 
 
 # CERT_REQUIRED means fetch the cert from the server all the time AND
 # validate it against the CA store provided in web.cacerts.
 
 def _plainapplepython():
     """return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that
     * is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file
       system
     * presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches
       for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided
       cacerts file
     """
     if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable:
         return False
     exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower()
     return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or
             exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/'))
 
 def _defaultcacerts():
     """return path to default CA certificates or None."""
     if _plainapplepython():
         dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem')
         if os.path.exists(dummycert):
             return dummycert
 
     return None
 
 def validatesocket(sock):
     """Validate a socket meets security requiremnets.
 
     The passed socket must have been created with ``wrapsocket()``.
     """
     host = sock._hgstate['hostname']
     ui = sock._hgstate['ui']
     settings = sock._hgstate['settings']
 
     try:
         peercert = sock.getpeercert(True)
         peercert2 = sock.getpeercert()
     except AttributeError:
         raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
 
     if not peercert:
         raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: '
                            'no certificate received') % host)
 
     if settings['disablecertverification']:
         # We don't print the certificate fingerprint because it shouldn't
         # be necessary: if the user requested certificate verification be
         # disabled, they presumably already saw a message about the inability
         # to verify the certificate and this message would have printed the
         # fingerprint. So printing the fingerprint here adds little to no
         # value.
         ui.warn(_('warning: connection security to %s is disabled per current '
                   'settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping '
                   'and tampering\n') % host)
         return
 
     # If a certificate fingerprint is pinned, use it and only it to
     # validate the remote cert.
     peerfingerprints = {
         'sha1': util.sha1(peercert).hexdigest(),
         'sha256': util.sha256(peercert).hexdigest(),
         'sha512': util.sha512(peercert).hexdigest(),
     }
 
     def fmtfingerprint(s):
         return ':'.join([s[x:x + 2] for x in range(0, len(s), 2)])
 
     legacyfingerprint = fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha1'])
     nicefingerprint = 'sha256:%s' % fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha256'])
 
     if settings['legacyfingerprint']:
         section = 'hostfingerprint'
     else:
         section = 'hostsecurity'
 
     if settings['certfingerprints']:
         for hash, fingerprint in settings['certfingerprints']:
             if peerfingerprints[hash].lower() == fingerprint:
                 ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s:%s\n' %
                          (host, hash, fmtfingerprint(fingerprint)))
                 return
 
         raise error.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected '
                             'fingerprint %s') % (host, legacyfingerprint),
                           hint=_('check %s configuration') % section)
 
     if not sock._hgstate['caloaded']:
-        ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s '
-                  'not verified (check %s or web.cacerts config '
-                  'setting)\n') %
-                (host, nicefingerprint, section))
+        ui.warn(_('warning: certificate for %s not verified '
+                  '(set hostsecurity.%s:certfingerprints=%s or web.cacerts '
+                  'config settings)\n') % (host, host, nicefingerprint))
         return
 
     msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host)
     if msg:
         raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg),
-                         hint=_('configure %s %s or use '
-                                '--insecure to connect insecurely') %
-                              (section, nicefingerprint))
+                         hint=_('set hostsecurity.%s:certfingerprints=%s '
+                                'config setting or use --insecure to connect '
+                                'insecurely') %
+                              (host, nicefingerprint))

tests/test-https.t

@@ -1,431 +1,431
 #require serve ssl
 
 Proper https client requires the built-in ssl from Python 2.6.
 
 Certificates created with:
  printf '.\n.\n.\n.\n.\nlocalhost\nhg@localhost\n' | \
  openssl req -newkey rsa:512 -keyout priv.pem -nodes -x509 -days 9000 -out pub.pem
 Can be dumped with:
  openssl x509 -in pub.pem -text
 
   $ cat << EOT > priv.pem
   > -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   > MIIBVAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAT4wggE6AgEAAkEApjCWeYGrIa/Vo7LH
   > aRF8ou0tbgHKE33Use/whCnKEUm34rDaXQd4lxxX6aDWg06n9tiVStAKTgQAHJY8
   > j/xgSwIDAQABAkBxHC6+Qlf0VJXGlb6NL16yEVVTQxqDS6hA9zqu6TZjrr0YMfzc
   > EGNIiZGt7HCBL0zO+cPDg/LeCZc6HQhf0KrhAiEAzlJq4hWWzvguWFIJWSoBeBUG
   > MF1ACazQO7PYE8M0qfECIQDONHHP0SKZzz/ZwBZcAveC5K61f/v9hONFwbeYulzR
   > +wIgc9SvbtgB/5Yzpp//4ZAEnR7oh5SClCvyB+KSx52K3nECICbhQphhoXmI10wy
   > aMTellaq0bpNMHFDziqH9RsqAHhjAiEAgYGxfzkftt5IUUn/iFK89aaIpyrpuaAh
   > HY8gUVkVRVs=
   > -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
   > EOT
 
   $ cat << EOT > pub.pem
   > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   > MIIBqzCCAVWgAwIBAgIJANAXFFyWjGnRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMDExEjAQBgNV
   > BAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDEbMBkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYMaGdAbG9jYWxob3N0MB4XDTEw
   > MTAxNDIwMzAxNFoXDTM1MDYwNTIwMzAxNFowMTESMBAGA1UEAwwJbG9jYWxob3N0
   > MRswGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgxoZ0Bsb2NhbGhvc3QwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANL
   > ADBIAkEApjCWeYGrIa/Vo7LHaRF8ou0tbgHKE33Use/whCnKEUm34rDaXQd4lxxX
   > 6aDWg06n9tiVStAKTgQAHJY8j/xgSwIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUE6sA+amm
   > r24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUE6sA+ammr24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQw
   > DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAANBAFArvQFiAZJgQczRsbYlG1xl
   > t+truk37w5B3m3Ick1ntRcQrqs+hf0CO1q6Squ144geYaQ8CDirSR92fICELI1c=
   > -----END CERTIFICATE-----
   > EOT
   $ cat priv.pem pub.pem >> server.pem
   $ PRIV=`pwd`/server.pem
 
   $ cat << EOT > pub-other.pem
   > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   > MIIBqzCCAVWgAwIBAgIJALwZS731c/ORMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMDExEjAQBgNV
   > BAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDEbMBkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYMaGdAbG9jYWxob3N0MB4XDTEw
   > MTAxNDIwNDUxNloXDTM1MDYwNTIwNDUxNlowMTESMBAGA1UEAwwJbG9jYWxob3N0
   > MRswGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgxoZ0Bsb2NhbGhvc3QwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANL
   > ADBIAkEAsxsapLbHrqqUKuQBxdpK4G3m2LjtyrTSdpzzzFlecxd5yhNP6AyWrufo
   > K4VMGo2xlu9xOo88nDSUNSKPuD09MwIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUoIB1iMhN
   > y868rpQ2qk9dHnU6ebswHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUoIB1iMhNy868rpQ2qk9dHnU6ebsw
   > DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAANBAJ544f125CsE7J2t55PdFaF6
   > bBlNBb91FCywBgSjhBjf+GG3TNPwrPdc3yqeq+hzJiuInqbOBv9abmMyq8Wsoig=
   > -----END CERTIFICATE-----
   > EOT
 
 pub.pem patched with other notBefore / notAfter:
 
   $ cat << EOT > pub-not-yet.pem
   > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   > MIIBqzCCAVWgAwIBAgIJANAXFFyWjGnRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMDExEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2Fs
   > aG9zdDEbMBkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYMaGdAbG9jYWxob3N0MB4XDTM1MDYwNTIwMzAxNFoXDTM1MDYw
   > NTIwMzAxNFowMTESMBAGA1UEAwwJbG9jYWxob3N0MRswGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgxoZ0Bsb2NhbGhv
   > c3QwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEApjCWeYGrIa/Vo7LHaRF8ou0tbgHKE33Use/whCnK
   > EUm34rDaXQd4lxxX6aDWg06n9tiVStAKTgQAHJY8j/xgSwIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUE6sA
   > +ammr24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUE6sA+ammr24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQwDAYDVR0T
   > BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAANBAJXV41gWnkgC7jcpPpFRSUSZaxyzrXmD1CIqQf0WgVDb
   > /12E0vR2DuZitgzUYtBaofM81aTtc0a2/YsrmqePGm0=
   > -----END CERTIFICATE-----
   > EOT
   $ cat priv.pem pub-not-yet.pem > server-not-yet.pem
 
   $ cat << EOT > pub-expired.pem
   > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   > MIIBqzCCAVWgAwIBAgIJANAXFFyWjGnRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMDExEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2Fs
   > aG9zdDEbMBkGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYMaGdAbG9jYWxob3N0MB4XDTEwMTAxNDIwMzAxNFoXDTEwMTAx
   > NDIwMzAxNFowMTESMBAGA1UEAwwJbG9jYWxob3N0MRswGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgxoZ0Bsb2NhbGhv
   > c3QwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEApjCWeYGrIa/Vo7LHaRF8ou0tbgHKE33Use/whCnK
   > EUm34rDaXQd4lxxX6aDWg06n9tiVStAKTgQAHJY8j/xgSwIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUE6sA
   > +ammr24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUE6sA+ammr24dGX0kpjxOgO45hzQwDAYDVR0T
   > BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAANBAJfk57DTRf2nUbYaMSlVAARxMNbFGOjQhAUtY400GhKt
   > 2uiKCNGKXVXD3AHWe13yHc5KttzbHQStE5Nm/DlWBWQ=
   > -----END CERTIFICATE-----
   > EOT
   $ cat priv.pem pub-expired.pem > server-expired.pem
 
 Client certificates created with:
  openssl genrsa -aes128 -passout pass:1234 -out client-key.pem 512
  openssl rsa -in client-key.pem -passin pass:1234 -out client-key-decrypted.pem
  printf '.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\nhg-client@localhost\n.\n.\n' | \
  openssl req -new -key client-key.pem -passin pass:1234 -out client-csr.pem
  openssl x509 -req -days 9000 -in client-csr.pem -CA pub.pem -CAkey priv.pem \
  -set_serial 01 -out client-cert.pem
 
   $ cat << EOT > client-key.pem
   > -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   > Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
   > DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,C8B8F103A61A336FB0716D1C0F8BB2E8
   > 
   > JolMlCFjEW3q3JJjO9z99NJWeJbFgF5DpUOkfSCxH56hxxtZb9x++rBvBZkxX1bF
   > BAIe+iI90+jdCLwxbILWuFcrJUaLC5WmO14XDKYVmr2eW9e4MiCYOlO0Q6a9rDFS
   > jctRCfvubOXFHbBGLH8uKEMpXEkP7Lc60FiIukqjuQEivJjrQirVtZCGwyk3qUi7
   > Eyh4Lo63IKGu8T1Bkmn2kaMvFhu7nC/CQLBjSq0YYI1tmCOkVb/3tPrz8oqgDJp2
   > u7bLS3q0xDNZ52nVrKIoZC/UlRXGlPyzPpa70/jPIdfCbkwDaBpRVXc+62Pj2n5/
   > CnO2xaKwfOG6pDvanBhFD72vuBOkAYlFZPiEku4sc2WlNggsSWCPCIFwzmiHjKIl
   > bWmdoTq3nb7sNfnBbV0OCa7fS1dFwCm4R1NC7ELENu0=
   > -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   > EOT
 
   $ cat << EOT > client-key-decrypted.pem
   > -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   > MIIBOgIBAAJBAJs4LS3glAYU92bg5kPgRPNW84ewB0fWJfAKccCp1ACHAdZPeaKb
   > FCinVMYKAVbVqBkyrZ/Tyr8aSfMz4xO4+KsCAwEAAQJAeKDr25+Q6jkZHEbkLRP6
   > AfMtR+Ixhk6TJT24sbZKIC2V8KuJTDEvUhLU0CAr1nH79bDqiSsecOiVCr2HHyfT
   > AQIhAM2C5rHbTs9R3PkywFEqq1gU3ztCnpiWglO7/cIkuGBhAiEAwVpMSAf77kop
   > 4h/1kWsgMALQTJNsXd4CEUK4BOxvJIsCIQCbarVAKBQvoT81jfX27AfscsxnKnh5
   > +MjSvkanvdFZwQIgbbcTefwt1LV4trtz2SR0i0nNcOZmo40Kl0jIquKO3qkCIH01
   > mJHzZr3+jQqeIFtr5P+Xqi30DJxgrnEobbJ0KFjY
   > -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   > EOT
 
   $ cat << EOT > client-cert.pem
   > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   > MIIBPjCB6QIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAxMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlsb2NhbGhvc3Qx
   > GzAZBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDGhnQGxvY2FsaG9zdDAeFw0xNTA1MDcwNjI5NDVaFw0z
   > OTEyMjcwNjI5NDVaMCQxIjAgBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWE2hnLWNsaWVudEBsb2NhbGhv
   > c3QwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAmzgtLeCUBhT3ZuDmQ+BE81bzh7AH
   > R9Yl8ApxwKnUAIcB1k95opsUKKdUxgoBVtWoGTKtn9PKvxpJ8zPjE7j4qwIDAQAB
   > MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA0EAfBTqBG5pYhuGk+ZnyUufgS+d7Nk/sZAZjNdCAEj/
   > NFPo5fR1jM6jlEWoWbeg298+SkjV7tfO+2nt0otUFkdM6A==
   > -----END CERTIFICATE-----
   > EOT
 
   $ hg init test
   $ cd test
   $ echo foo>foo
   $ mkdir foo.d foo.d/bAr.hg.d foo.d/baR.d.hg
   $ echo foo>foo.d/foo
   $ echo bar>foo.d/bAr.hg.d/BaR
   $ echo bar>foo.d/baR.d.hg/bAR
   $ hg commit -A -m 1
   adding foo
   adding foo.d/bAr.hg.d/BaR
   adding foo.d/baR.d.hg/bAR
   adding foo.d/foo
   $ hg serve -p $HGPORT -d --pid-file=../hg0.pid --certificate=$PRIV
   $ cat ../hg0.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS
 
 cacert not found
 
   $ hg in --config web.cacerts=no-such.pem https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: could not find web.cacerts: no-such.pem
   [255]
 
 Test server address cannot be reused
 
 #if windows
   $ hg serve -p $HGPORT --certificate=$PRIV 2>&1
   abort: cannot start server at ':$HGPORT':
   [255]
 #else
   $ hg serve -p $HGPORT --certificate=$PRIV 2>&1
   abort: cannot start server at ':$HGPORT': Address already in use
   [255]
 #endif
   $ cd ..
 
 Our test cert is not signed by a trusted CA. It should fail to verify if
 we are able to load CA certs.
 
 #if defaultcacerts
   $ hg clone https://localhost:$HGPORT/ copy-pull
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
 #endif
 
   $ DISABLECACERTS="--config devel.disableloaddefaultcerts=true"
 
 clone via pull
 
   $ hg clone https://localhost:$HGPORT/ copy-pull $DISABLECACERTS
-  warning: localhost certificate with fingerprint sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 not verified (check hostsecurity or web.cacerts config setting)
+  warning: certificate for localhost not verified (set hostsecurity.localhost:certfingerprints=sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 or web.cacerts config settings)
   requesting all changes
   adding changesets
   adding manifests
   adding file changes
   added 1 changesets with 4 changes to 4 files
   updating to branch default
   4 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved
   $ hg verify -R copy-pull
   checking changesets
   checking manifests
   crosschecking files in changesets and manifests
   checking files
   4 files, 1 changesets, 4 total revisions
   $ cd test
   $ echo bar > bar
   $ hg commit -A -d '1 0' -m 2
   adding bar
   $ cd ..
 
 pull without cacert
 
   $ cd copy-pull
   $ echo '[hooks]' >> .hg/hgrc
   $ echo "changegroup = printenv.py changegroup" >> .hg/hgrc
   $ hg pull $DISABLECACERTS
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
-  warning: localhost certificate with fingerprint sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 not verified (check hostsecurity or web.cacerts config setting)
+  warning: certificate for localhost not verified (set hostsecurity.localhost:certfingerprints=sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 or web.cacerts config settings)
   searching for changes
   adding changesets
   adding manifests
   adding file changes
   added 1 changesets with 1 changes to 1 files
   changegroup hook: HG_NODE=5fed3813f7f5e1824344fdc9cf8f63bb662c292d HG_NODE_LAST=5fed3813f7f5e1824344fdc9cf8f63bb662c292d HG_SOURCE=pull HG_TXNID=TXN:* HG_URL=https://localhost:$HGPORT/ (glob)
   (run 'hg update' to get a working copy)
   $ cd ..
 
 cacert configured in local repo
 
   $ cp copy-pull/.hg/hgrc copy-pull/.hg/hgrc.bu
   $ echo "[web]" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
   $ echo "cacerts=`pwd`/pub.pem" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --traceback
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   searching for changes
   no changes found
   $ mv copy-pull/.hg/hgrc.bu copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
 
 cacert configured globally, also testing expansion of environment
 variables in the filename
 
   $ echo "[web]" >> $HGRCPATH
   $ echo 'cacerts=$P/pub.pem' >> $HGRCPATH
   $ P=`pwd` hg -R copy-pull pull
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   searching for changes
   no changes found
   $ P=`pwd` hg -R copy-pull pull --insecure
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   warning: connection security to localhost is disabled per current settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering
   searching for changes
   no changes found
 
 cacert mismatch
 
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub.pem https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/
   pulling from https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/
   abort: 127.0.0.1 certificate error: certificate is for localhost
-  (configure hostsecurity sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 or use --insecure to connect insecurely)
+  (set hostsecurity.127.0.0.1:certfingerprints=sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30 config setting or use --insecure to connect insecurely)
   [255]
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub.pem https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/ --insecure
   pulling from https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/
   warning: connection security to 127.0.0.1 is disabled per current settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering
   searching for changes
   no changes found
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-other.pem
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-other.pem --insecure
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   warning: connection security to localhost is disabled per current settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering
   searching for changes
   no changes found
 
 Test server cert which isn't valid yet
 
   $ hg serve -R test -p $HGPORT1 -d --pid-file=hg1.pid --certificate=server-not-yet.pem
   $ cat hg1.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-not-yet.pem https://localhost:$HGPORT1/
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT1/
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
 
 Test server cert which no longer is valid
 
   $ hg serve -R test -p $HGPORT2 -d --pid-file=hg2.pid --certificate=server-expired.pem
   $ cat hg2.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS
   $ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-expired.pem https://localhost:$HGPORT2/
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT2/
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
 
 Fingerprints
 
 - works without cacerts (hostkeyfingerprints)
   $ hg -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --insecure --config hostfingerprints.localhost=91:4f:1a:ff:87:24:9c:09:b6:85:9b:88:b1:90:6d:30:75:64:91:ca
   5fed3813f7f5
 
 - works without cacerts (hostsecurity)
   $ hg -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --config hostsecurity.localhost:fingerprints=sha1:914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca
   5fed3813f7f5
 
   $ hg -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --config hostsecurity.localhost:fingerprints=sha256:62:09:97:2f:97:60:e3:65:8f:12:5d:78:9e:35:a1:36:7a:65:4b:0e:9f:ac:db:c3:bc:6e:b6:a3:c0:16:e0:30
   5fed3813f7f5
 
 - multiple fingerprints specified and first matches
   $ hg --config 'hostfingerprints.localhost=914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca, deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --insecure
   5fed3813f7f5
 
   $ hg --config 'hostsecurity.localhost:fingerprints=sha1:914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca, sha1:deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   5fed3813f7f5
 
 - multiple fingerprints specified and last matches
   $ hg --config 'hostfingerprints.localhost=deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef, 914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --insecure
   5fed3813f7f5
 
   $ hg --config 'hostsecurity.localhost:fingerprints=sha1:deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef, sha1:914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   5fed3813f7f5
 
 - multiple fingerprints specified and none match
 
   $ hg --config 'hostfingerprints.localhost=deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef, aeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ --insecure
   abort: certificate for localhost has unexpected fingerprint 91:4f:1a:ff:87:24:9c:09:b6:85:9b:88:b1:90:6d:30:75:64:91:ca
   (check hostfingerprint configuration)
   [255]
 
   $ hg --config 'hostsecurity.localhost:fingerprints=sha1:deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef, sha1:aeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef' -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: certificate for localhost has unexpected fingerprint 91:4f:1a:ff:87:24:9c:09:b6:85:9b:88:b1:90:6d:30:75:64:91:ca
   (check hostsecurity configuration)
   [255]
 
 - fails when cert doesn't match hostname (port is ignored)
   $ hg -R copy-pull id https://localhost:$HGPORT1/ --config hostfingerprints.localhost=914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca
   abort: certificate for localhost has unexpected fingerprint 28:ff:71:bf:65:31:14:23:ad:62:92:b4:0e:31:99:18:fc:83:e3:9b
   (check hostfingerprint configuration)
   [255]
 
 
 - ignores that certificate doesn't match hostname
   $ hg -R copy-pull id https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/ --config hostfingerprints.127.0.0.1=914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca
   5fed3813f7f5
 
 HGPORT1 is reused below for tinyproxy tests. Kill that server.
   $ killdaemons.py hg1.pid
 
 Prepare for connecting through proxy
 
   $ tinyproxy.py $HGPORT1 localhost >proxy.log </dev/null 2>&1 &
   $ while [ ! -f proxy.pid ]; do sleep 0; done
   $ cat proxy.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS
 
   $ echo "[http_proxy]" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
   $ echo "always=True" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
   $ echo "[hostfingerprints]" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
   $ echo "localhost =" >> copy-pull/.hg/hgrc
 
 Test unvalidated https through proxy
 
   $ http_proxy=http://localhost:$HGPORT1/ hg -R copy-pull pull --insecure --traceback
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   warning: connection security to localhost is disabled per current settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering
   searching for changes
   no changes found
 
 Test https with cacert and fingerprint through proxy
 
   $ http_proxy=http://localhost:$HGPORT1/ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub.pem
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   searching for changes
   no changes found
   $ http_proxy=http://localhost:$HGPORT1/ hg -R copy-pull pull https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/ --config hostfingerprints.127.0.0.1=914f1aff87249c09b6859b88b1906d30756491ca
   pulling from https://127.0.0.1:$HGPORT/
   searching for changes
   no changes found
 
 Test https with cert problems through proxy
 
   $ http_proxy=http://localhost:$HGPORT1/ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-other.pem
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
   $ http_proxy=http://localhost:$HGPORT1/ hg -R copy-pull pull --config web.cacerts=pub-expired.pem https://localhost:$HGPORT2/
   pulling from https://localhost:$HGPORT2/
   abort: error: *certificate verify failed* (glob)
   [255]
 
 
   $ killdaemons.py hg0.pid
 
 #if sslcontext
 
 Start patched hgweb that requires client certificates:
 
   $ cat << EOT > reqclientcert.py
   > import ssl
   > from mercurial.hgweb import server
   > class _httprequesthandlersslclientcert(server._httprequesthandlerssl):
   >     @staticmethod
   >     def preparehttpserver(httpserver, ssl_cert):
   >         sslcontext = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1)
   >         sslcontext.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
   >         sslcontext.load_cert_chain(ssl_cert)
   >         # verify clients by server certificate
   >         sslcontext.load_verify_locations(ssl_cert)
   >         httpserver.socket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(httpserver.socket,
   >                                                    server_side=True)
   > server._httprequesthandlerssl = _httprequesthandlersslclientcert
   > EOT
   $ cd test
   $ hg serve -p $HGPORT -d --pid-file=../hg0.pid --certificate=$PRIV \
   > --config extensions.reqclientcert=../reqclientcert.py
   $ cat ../hg0.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS
   $ cd ..
 
 without client certificate:
 
   $ P=`pwd` hg id https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: error: *handshake failure* (glob)
   [255]
 
 with client certificate:
 
   $ cat << EOT >> $HGRCPATH
   > [auth]
   > l.prefix = localhost
   > l.cert = client-cert.pem
   > l.key = client-key.pem
   > EOT
 
   $ P=`pwd` hg id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ \
   > --config auth.l.key=client-key-decrypted.pem
   5fed3813f7f5
 
   $ printf '1234\n' | env P=`pwd` hg id https://localhost:$HGPORT/ \
   > --config ui.interactive=True --config ui.nontty=True
   passphrase for client-key.pem: 5fed3813f7f5
 
   $ env P=`pwd` hg id https://localhost:$HGPORT/
   abort: error: * (glob)
   [255]
 
 #endif