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revlog: rewrite censoring logic...
revlog: rewrite censoring logic I was able to corrupt a revlog relatively easily with the existing censoring code. The underlying problem is that the existing code doesn't fully take delta chains into account. When copying revisions that occur after the censored revision, the delta base can refer to a censored revision. Then at read time, things blow up due to the revision data not being a compressed delta. This commit rewrites the revlog censoring code to take a higher-level approach. We now create a new revlog instance pointing at temp files. We iterate through each revision in the source revlog and insert those revisions into the new revlog, replacing the censored revision's data along the way. The new implementation isn't as efficient as the old one. This is because it will fully engage delta computation on insertion. But I don't think it matters. The new implementation is a bit hacky because it attempts to reload the revlog instance with a new revlog index/data file. This is fragile. But this is needed because the index (which could be backed by C) would have a cached copy of the old, possibly changed data and that could lead to problems accessing index or revision data later. One benefit of the new approach is that we integrate with the transaction. The old revlog is backed up and if the transaction is rolled back, the original revlog is restored. As part of this, we had to teach the transaction about the store vfs. I'm not super keen about this. But this was the easiest way to hook things up to the transaction. We /could/ just ignore the transaction like we were doing before. But any file mutation should be governed by transaction semantics, including undo during rollback. Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D4869
Mads Kiilerich - - Load All Authors

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dummycert.pem
56 lines | 2.2 KiB | application/pgp-keys | AscLexer
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A dummy certificate that will make OS X 10.6+ Python use the system CA
certificate store:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBIzCBzgIJANjmj39sb3FmMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDmhn
LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTE0MDgzMDA4NDU1OVoXDTE0MDgyOTA4NDU1OVowGTEX
MBUGA1UEAxMOaGcuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA
mh/ZySGlcq0ALNLmA1gZqt61HruywPrRk6WyrLJRgt+X7OP9FFlEfl2tzHfzqvmK
CtSQoPINWOdAJMekBYFgKQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA0EAF9h49LkSqJ6a
IlpogZuUHtihXeKZBsiktVIDlDccYsNy0RSh9XxUfhk+XMLw8jBlYvcltSXdJ7We
aKdQRekuMQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
This certificate was generated to be syntactically valid but never be usable;
it expired before it became valid.
Created as:
$ cat > cn.conf << EOT
> [req]
> distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
> [req_distinguished_name]
> commonName = Common Name
> commonName_default = no.example.com
> EOT
$ openssl req -nodes -new -x509 -keyout /dev/null \
> -out dummycert.pem -days -1 -config cn.conf -subj '/CN=hg.example.com'
To verify the content of this certificate:
$ openssl x509 -in dummycert.pem -noout -text
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 1 (0x0)
Serial Number: 15629337334278746470 (0xd8e68f7f6c6f7166)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=hg.example.com
Validity
Not Before: Aug 30 08:45:59 2014 GMT
Not After : Aug 29 08:45:59 2014 GMT
Subject: CN=hg.example.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (512 bit)
Modulus:
00:9a:1f:d9:c9:21:a5:72:ad:00:2c:d2:e6:03:58:
19:aa:de:b5:1e:bb:b2:c0:fa:d1:93:a5:b2:ac:b2:
51:82:df:97:ec:e3:fd:14:59:44:7e:5d:ad:cc:77:
f3:aa:f9:8a:0a:d4:90:a0:f2:0d:58:e7:40:24:c7:
a4:05:81:60:29
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
17:d8:78:f4:b9:12:a8:9e:9a:22:5a:68:81:9b:94:1e:d8:a1:
5d:e2:99:06:c8:a4:b5:52:03:94:37:1c:62:c3:72:d1:14:a1:
f5:7c:54:7e:19:3e:5c:c2:f0:f2:30:65:62:f7:25:b5:25:dd:
27:b5:9e:68:a7:50:45:e9:2e:31