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subrepo: set GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL to limit git clone protocols (SEC)...
subrepo: set GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL to limit git clone protocols (SEC) CVE-2016-3068 (1/1) Git's git-remote-ext remote helper provides an ext:: URL scheme that allows running arbitrary shell commands. This feature allows implementing simple git smart transports with a single shell shell command. However, git submodules could clone arbitrary URLs specified in the .gitmodules file. This was reported as CVE-2015-7545 and fixed in git v2.6.1. However, if a user directly clones a malicious ext URL, the git client will still run arbitrary shell commands. Mercurial is similarly effected. Mercurial allows specifying git repositories as subrepositories. Git ext:: URLs can be specified as Mercurial subrepositories allowing arbitrary shell commands to be run on `hg clone ...`. The Mercurial community would like to thank Blake Burkhart for reporting this issue. The description of the issue is copied from Blake's report. This commit changes submodules to pass the GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL env variable to git commands with the same list of allowed protocols that git submodule is using. When the GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL env variable is already set, we just pass it to git without modifications.

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exewrapper.c
174 lines | 4.4 KiB | text/x-c | CLexer
/*
exewrapper.c - wrapper for calling a python script on Windows
Copyright 2012 Adrian Buehlmann <adrian@cadifra.com> and others
This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include "hgpythonlib.h"
#ifdef __GNUC__
int strcat_s(char *d, size_t n, const char *s)
{
return !strncat(d, s, n);
}
int strcpy_s(char *d, size_t n, const char *s)
{
return !strncpy(d, s, n);
}
#endif
static char pyscript[MAX_PATH + 10];
static char pyhome[MAX_PATH + 10];
static char envpyhome[MAX_PATH + 10];
static char pydllfile[MAX_PATH + 10];
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char *p;
int ret;
int i;
int n;
char **pyargv;
WIN32_FIND_DATA fdata;
HANDLE hfind;
const char *err;
HMODULE pydll;
void (__cdecl *Py_SetPythonHome)(char *home);
int (__cdecl *Py_Main)(int argc, char *argv[]);
if (GetModuleFileName(NULL, pyscript, sizeof(pyscript)) == 0)
{
err = "GetModuleFileName failed";
goto bail;
}
p = strrchr(pyscript, '.');
if (p == NULL) {
err = "malformed module filename";
goto bail;
}
*p = 0; /* cut trailing ".exe" */
strcpy_s(pyhome, sizeof(pyhome), pyscript);
hfind = FindFirstFile(pyscript, &fdata);
if (hfind != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
/* pyscript exists, close handle */
FindClose(hfind);
} else {
/* file pyscript isn't there, take <pyscript>exe.py */
strcat_s(pyscript, sizeof(pyscript), "exe.py");
}
pydll = NULL;
/*
We first check, that environment variable PYTHONHOME is *not* set.
This just mimicks the behavior of the regular python.exe, which uses
PYTHONHOME to find its installation directory (if it has been set).
Note: Users of HackableMercurial are expected to *not* set PYTHONHOME!
*/
if (GetEnvironmentVariable("PYTHONHOME", envpyhome,
sizeof(envpyhome)) == 0)
{
/*
Environment var PYTHONHOME is *not* set. Let's see if we are
running inside a HackableMercurial.
*/
p = strrchr(pyhome, '\\');
if (p == NULL) {
err = "can't find backslash in module filename";
goto bail;
}
*p = 0; /* cut at directory */
/* check for private Python of HackableMercurial */
strcat_s(pyhome, sizeof(pyhome), "\\hg-python");
hfind = FindFirstFile(pyhome, &fdata);
if (hfind != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
/* path pyhome exists, let's use it */
FindClose(hfind);
strcpy_s(pydllfile, sizeof(pydllfile), pyhome);
strcat_s(pydllfile, sizeof(pydllfile), "\\" HGPYTHONLIB);
pydll = LoadLibrary(pydllfile);
if (pydll == NULL) {
err = "failed to load private Python DLL "
HGPYTHONLIB ".dll";
goto bail;
}
Py_SetPythonHome = (void*)GetProcAddress(pydll,
"Py_SetPythonHome");
if (Py_SetPythonHome == NULL) {
err = "failed to get Py_SetPythonHome";
goto bail;
}
Py_SetPythonHome(pyhome);
}
}
if (pydll == NULL) {
pydll = LoadLibrary(HGPYTHONLIB);
if (pydll == NULL) {
err = "failed to load Python DLL " HGPYTHONLIB ".dll";
goto bail;
}
}
Py_Main = (void*)GetProcAddress(pydll, "Py_Main");
if (Py_Main == NULL) {
err = "failed to get Py_Main";
goto bail;
}
/*
Only add the pyscript to the args, if it's not already there. It may
already be there, if the script spawned a child process of itself, in
the same way as it got called, that is, with the pyscript already in
place. So we optionally accept the pyscript as the first argument
(argv[1]), letting our exe taking the role of the python interpreter.
*/
if (argc >= 2 && strcmp(argv[1], pyscript) == 0) {
/*
pyscript is already in the args, so there is no need to copy
the args and we can directly call the python interpreter with
the original args.
*/
return Py_Main(argc, argv);
}
/*
Start assembling the args for the Python interpreter call. We put the
name of our exe (argv[0]) in the position where the python.exe
canonically is, and insert the pyscript next.
*/
pyargv = malloc((argc + 5) * sizeof(char*));
if (pyargv == NULL) {
err = "not enough memory";
goto bail;
}
n = 0;
pyargv[n++] = argv[0];
pyargv[n++] = pyscript;
/* copy remaining args from the command line */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
pyargv[n++] = argv[i];
/* argv[argc] is guaranteed to be NULL, so we forward that guarantee */
pyargv[n] = NULL;
ret = Py_Main(n, pyargv); /* The Python interpreter call */
free(pyargv);
return ret;
bail:
fprintf(stderr, "abort: %s\n", err);
return 255;
}