##// END OF EJS Templates
hgweb: support Content Security Policy...
hgweb: support Content Security Policy Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example, a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme, hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS. Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens today, the full power of the web browser is available to that malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate security problems posed by malicious data. CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This works for some CSP policies, but not all. For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location. This commit introduces support for emitting a Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special "%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in. The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy the guarantees of a nonce.

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filelog.py
137 lines | 4.2 KiB | text/x-python | PythonLexer
# filelog.py - file history class for mercurial
#
# Copyright 2005-2007 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
#
# This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
# GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
from __future__ import absolute_import
import re
import struct
from . import (
error,
mdiff,
revlog,
)
_mdre = re.compile('\1\n')
def parsemeta(text):
"""return (metadatadict, keylist, metadatasize)"""
# text can be buffer, so we can't use .startswith or .index
if text[:2] != '\1\n':
return None, None
s = _mdre.search(text, 2).start()
mtext = text[2:s]
meta = {}
for l in mtext.splitlines():
k, v = l.split(": ", 1)
meta[k] = v
return meta, (s + 2)
def packmeta(meta, text):
keys = sorted(meta.iterkeys())
metatext = "".join("%s: %s\n" % (k, meta[k]) for k in keys)
return "\1\n%s\1\n%s" % (metatext, text)
def _censoredtext(text):
m, offs = parsemeta(text)
return m and "censored" in m
class filelog(revlog.revlog):
def __init__(self, opener, path):
super(filelog, self).__init__(opener,
"/".join(("data", path + ".i")))
def read(self, node):
t = self.revision(node)
if not t.startswith('\1\n'):
return t
s = t.index('\1\n', 2)
return t[s + 2:]
def add(self, text, meta, transaction, link, p1=None, p2=None):
if meta or text.startswith('\1\n'):
text = packmeta(meta, text)
return self.addrevision(text, transaction, link, p1, p2)
def renamed(self, node):
if self.parents(node)[0] != revlog.nullid:
return False
t = self.revision(node)
m = parsemeta(t)[0]
if m and "copy" in m:
return (m["copy"], revlog.bin(m["copyrev"]))
return False
def size(self, rev):
"""return the size of a given revision"""
# for revisions with renames, we have to go the slow way
node = self.node(rev)
if self.renamed(node):
return len(self.read(node))
if self.iscensored(rev):
return 0
# XXX if self.read(node).startswith("\1\n"), this returns (size+4)
return super(filelog, self).size(rev)
def cmp(self, node, text):
"""compare text with a given file revision
returns True if text is different than what is stored.
"""
t = text
if text.startswith('\1\n'):
t = '\1\n\1\n' + text
samehashes = not super(filelog, self).cmp(node, t)
if samehashes:
return False
# censored files compare against the empty file
if self.iscensored(self.rev(node)):
return text != ''
# renaming a file produces a different hash, even if the data
# remains unchanged. Check if it's the case (slow):
if self.renamed(node):
t2 = self.read(node)
return t2 != text
return True
def checkhash(self, text, node, p1=None, p2=None, rev=None):
try:
super(filelog, self).checkhash(text, node, p1=p1, p2=p2, rev=rev)
except error.RevlogError:
if _censoredtext(text):
raise error.CensoredNodeError(self.indexfile, node, text)
raise
def iscensored(self, rev):
"""Check if a file revision is censored."""
return self.flags(rev) & revlog.REVIDX_ISCENSORED
def _peek_iscensored(self, baserev, delta, flush):
"""Quickly check if a delta produces a censored revision."""
# Fragile heuristic: unless new file meta keys are added alphabetically
# preceding "censored", all censored revisions are prefixed by
# "\1\ncensored:". A delta producing such a censored revision must be a
# full-replacement delta, so we inspect the first and only patch in the
# delta for this prefix.
hlen = struct.calcsize(">lll")
if len(delta) <= hlen:
return False
oldlen = self.rawsize(baserev)
newlen = len(delta) - hlen
if delta[:hlen] != mdiff.replacediffheader(oldlen, newlen):
return False
add = "\1\ncensored:"
addlen = len(add)
return newlen >= addlen and delta[hlen:hlen + addlen] == add