##// END OF EJS Templates
hgweb: support Content Security Policy...
hgweb: support Content Security Policy Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example, a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme, hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS. Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens today, the full power of the web browser is available to that malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate security problems posed by malicious data. CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This works for some CSP policies, but not all. For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location. This commit introduces support for emitting a Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special "%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in. The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy the guarantees of a nonce.

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r29749:155f0cc3 default
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mpatch.h
26 lines | 689 B | text/x-c | CLexer
#ifndef _HG_MPATCH_H_
#define _HG_MPATCH_H_
#define MPATCH_ERR_NO_MEM -3
#define MPATCH_ERR_CANNOT_BE_DECODED -2
#define MPATCH_ERR_INVALID_PATCH -1
struct mpatch_frag {
int start, end, len;
const char *data;
};
struct mpatch_flist {
struct mpatch_frag *base, *head, *tail;
};
int mpatch_decode(const char *bin, ssize_t len, struct mpatch_flist** res);
ssize_t mpatch_calcsize(ssize_t len, struct mpatch_flist *l);
void mpatch_lfree(struct mpatch_flist *a);
int mpatch_apply(char *buf, const char *orig, ssize_t len,
struct mpatch_flist *l);
struct mpatch_flist *mpatch_fold(void *bins,
struct mpatch_flist* (*get_next_item)(void*, ssize_t),
ssize_t start, ssize_t end);
#endif